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Summary
Contracting a marriage under African customary law in Malawi poses dif-
ficulties and challenges in the light of the Bill of Rights and international 
human rights standards. There are bound to be conflicts which, seen from 
a human rights perspective, amount to violations of women’s human 
rights. The article explores the nature of the conflict between human rights 
and a plethora of principles, rules and practices pertaining to marriage 
under African customary law in Malawi. The article also shows strong 
support from both men and women for cultural practices that conflict 
with women’s human rights. It is therefore argued that efforts to eradicate 
these cultural practices, however well-intended, must be undertaken with 
a very high level of cultural sensitivity. It is suggested that, instead of a for-
mal approach to the realisation of human rights, a substantive approach 
which is inclusive of the reasons behind the support for cultural beliefs 
and values, be adopted in order to address those aspects of a particular 
cultural practice that violate human rights.
1 Introduction
The article examines the way in which the Bill of Rights and international 
human rights standards conflict with a plethora of principles, rules 
and practices of African customary family law that govern customary 
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marriage in Malawi. The article also shows how strong cultural sup-
port can pose a threat to any effort aimed at addressing human rights 
violations in African customary law. It is therefore suggested that a 
substantive approach be adopted.
The words ‘formal approach’ and ‘substantive approach’ are bor-
rowed from formal equality and substantive equality paradigms.1 A 
formal approach means using law in its strict sense to address human 
rights violations. A substantive approach entails the use of law, while 
taking into account the reasons behind views in support of cultural val-
ues when implementing human rights. The position therefore is that 
the formal approach is not sufficient to address human rights violations 
under African customary law.
The article is divided into five sections. The next section examines the 
position of international human rights law in the Malawian Constitu-
tion (Constitution). The section also briefly discusses the international 
human rights position on cultural practices that conflict with human 
rights. The aim is to highlight the relevance of international human 
rights standards in Malawi. The third section looks at the position of 
customary law under the Constitution and discusses the implications 
of the status that the Constitution gives to customary laws. The fourth 
section discusses principles and practices governing a customary 
marriage in Malawi. Both matrilineal2 and patrilineal3 marriages 
are examined with a view to revealing the traditional values that are 
incompatible with the Bill of Rights and international human rights 
standards. The last section concludes the discussion.
2 Position of international human rights law in terms 
of the Constitution
The position of international human rights law in terms of the Consti-
tution may be looked at in different ways. Firstly, some international 
human rights norms have been elevated to constitutional status in the 
1 J de Waal et al The Bill of Rights handbook (2005) 232 have defined formal equality as 
‘sameness of treatment’. The law must treat individuals in the same manner regard-
less of their circumstances. In other words, formal equality supports the view that a 
person’s individual physical or personal characteristics should be viewed as irrelevant 
in determining whether they have a right to some social benefit or gain. On the 
other hand, substantive equality requires the law to ensure that there is equality of 
outcome. It is partially based on a redistributive justice model which suggests that 
measures have to be taken to rectify past discrimination, because to fail to do so 
would leave people and groups at different starting points.
2 Matrilineal customary marriage refers to all customary marriages that trace their 
descent line through female relatives. 
3 Patrilineal customary marriage refers to all customary marriages that trace their 
descent line through male relatives. 
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Constitution, which renders them justiciable in Malawian courts.4 This 
is through a direct incorporation of certain international law standards 
in the Constitution. For example, the non-discrimination clause, a key 
principle of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women (CEDAW)5 and other international instruments, 
has been enshrined in the Malawian Constitution.6 In addition, inter-
national law has been granted an elevated status in the Malawian 
Constitution, not only in relation to the interpretation of constitutional 
provisions, but also as a factor relevant in the development of custom-
ary law and in the interpretation of municipal statutes by the judiciary.7 
Consequently, international law assumes a position of importance in 
relation to two aspects of legal development in this sphere; namely, in 
respect of the drafting of legislation, and in respect of law reform via 
judicial interpretation.
The second angle derives from the legal status of international law 
in Malawian municipal law. According to section 211(2) of the Con-
stitution, certain international agreements form part of the laws of 
Malawi.8 This position is relevant with respect to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),9 the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC),10 the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),11 CEDAW,12 and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter).13 
As can be seen from their date of ratification, all these international 
agreements became part of domestic law in Malawi by virtue of sec-
tion 211(2) of the Constitution and are, therefore, enforceable as part 
of domestic law.
4 Sec 4 provides that ‘[t]he Constitution shall bind all executive, legislative and judicial 
organs of the state at all levels of government and all the peoples of Malawi are 
entitled to equal protection of this Constitution, and laws made under it’.
5 CEDAW was adopted on 18 December 1979 and entered into force on 3 September 
1981.
6 An example would be sec 20 of the Malawian Constitution on the right to equality.
7 Sec 11(2)(c) of the Malawian Constitution provides that ‘[i]n interpreting the provi-
sions of this Constitution a court of law shall …where applicable, have regard to 
current norms of public international law and comparable foreign case law’.
8 Section 211(2) of the Constitution provides that ‘[i]nternational agreements entered 
into before the commencement of this Constitution and binding on the Republic 
shall form part of the law of the Republic, unless Parliament subsequently provides 
otherwise or the agreement otherwise lapses’.
9 Ratified by Malawi in 1993; GA Resolution 2200A(xxi) 21UNGAOR Suppl (No 16) 52, 
UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171, entered into force on 23 March 1976.
10 Ratified by Malawi in 1991.
11 Ratified by Malawi in 1993; GA Resolution 2200A(xxi) 21UNGAOR Suppl (No 16) 49, 
UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3, entered into force on 3 January 1976.
12 Ratified by Malawi in 1987.
13 Ratified by Malawi in 1989. The African Charter was adopted on 27 June 1981 and 
entered into force on 21 October 1986.
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2.1 Position of international human rights law regarding 
cultural practices that conflict with human rights
At the international level, it is important to note that many instru-
ments recognise the application and relevance of African customary 
law. Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal 
Declaration)14 states that ’[e]veryone, as a member of society … is 
entitled to the realisation of the economic, social and cultural rights 
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personal-
ity’. Further, article 27(1) provides: ‘Everyone has the right to freely 
participate in a cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to 
share in scientific advancement and its benefits’ (my emphasis).
As a declaration, the Universal Declaration is a non-binding instru-
ment that merely states the aspirations of nation states. However, it 
is submitted that it has become part of binding international law in 
Malawi. Reasons that can be advanced to substantiate this point are 
twofold. First, the standards laid down in the Universal Declaration 
were re-enacted in two conventions that are binding on states. These 
are ICCPR and ICESCR. Articles 15(1)(a)15 and 2716 of ICESCR and 
ICCPR, respectively, provide for the protection of cultural rights.
Secondly, the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) has held that 
the Universal Declaration applies and is enforceable in Malawi.17 In 
the Chihana case, the SCA held that the Universal Declaration is part 
of Malawi’s law and that the freedoms that it guarantees must be 
respected and can be enforced in the courts of Malawi.18 Following 
the Chihana case, it has been noted that the cases of Chisiza v Ministry 
of Education and Culture19 and S v Nkhata20 have made reference to 
provisions of the Universal Declaration.21 At the regional level, rights 
to culture are declared in the African Charter.22
14 The Universal Declaration was adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution on 
10 December 1948.
15 Art 15(1)(a) of ICESCR provides: ‘The State Parties to the present Covenant recognise 
the right of everyone (a) to take part in a cultural life.’ 
16 Art 27 of ICCPR provides: ‘In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, 
in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to 
profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.’ 
17 See the case of R v Chakufwa Chihana SCA Criminal Appeal 9 of 1993, as cited by 
S White et al Dispossessing the widow: Gender-based violence in Malawi (2002) 32. See 
also TT Hansen ‘Implementation of international human rights standards through 
the national courts in Malawi’ (2002) 46 Journal of African Law 31 37, who noted that 
the SCA considered the Universal Declaration as part of the law of Malawi.
18 As above.
19 Miscellaneous Civil Case 10 of 1993 (unreported).
20 Miscellaneous Civil Case 6 of 1993 (unreported).
21 Hansen (n 17 above) 37-38.
22 See eg art 17 of the African Charter.
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Of particular importance in this article, however, is whether the 
protection of cultural rights at the international level constitutes a jus-
tifiable reason for violating human rights.
The position at international level is that no international human 
rights document cites culture as a basis on which protections may be 
abridged.23 Rather than protecting culture at the expense of human 
rights, international documents reveal that culture necessarily must 
cede to universal standards.24 Indeed, as the above mandate suggests, 
cultures are protected so that they may enhance human rights and 
not lead to their derogation.25 Such an interpretation finds support in 
article 1(3) of the United Nations (UN) Charter,26 which seeks
to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of 
an economic, social, cultural, humanitarian character and in promoting 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
The language of the above provision makes clear two things: Human 
rights are not dependent on a specific culture, and human rights are 
to be respected without distinction as to the basic markers that influ-
ence different manifestations of cultural life: sex and religion, among 
others.27
Furthermore, numerous treaties that followed the UN Charter serve 
as examples of the approach that places the preservation of human 
rights as a fundamental universal principle, even when human rights 
protections challenge cultural practices. CEDAW confronts the pos-
sibility of misuse of culture as a pretext to violate women’s rights in 
the following way. Article 5 of CEDAW requires state parties to take all 
appropriate measures to
modify the social and cultural patterns of men and women, with a view to 
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other prac-
tices which are based on the idea of the inferiority of either of the sexes or 
on stereotyped roles for men and women.
Article 2(f) of CEDAW provides:
State parties … by all appropriate means and without delay … undertake: 
… (f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation to modify or 
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute 
discrimination against women.
23 JR Levesque Culture and family violence: Fostering change through human rights law 
(2001) 95-96. 
24 R Cook ‘State accountability under the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women’ in R Cook (ed) Human rights of women: National 
and international perspectives (1994) 234-235.
25 Levesque (n 23 above ) 96.
26 The UN Charter was adopted on 26 June 1945.
27 Levesque (n 23 above) 96.
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With particular reference to discriminatory customary family practices 
at the point of contracting a marriage, articles 16(1)(a) and (b) of 
CEDAW28 provide:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and 
in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:
(a) the same right to enter into marriage;
(b) the same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage 
only with their free and full consent.
Apart from CEDAW, CRC also deals with discriminatory customary 
family law practices that affect women, especially young girls.29 In addi-
tion, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women of 
199430 makes an important statement. Article 4 firmly rejects cultural 
relativism31 as it prohibits states from invoking ‘any custom, tradition or 
religious consideration to avoid their obligations’ in pursuit of a policy 
of eliminating gender discrimination by all appropriate means and 
without delay.
At the regional level, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child (African Children’s Charter) deals with discriminatory 
practices that affect young girls.32 Furthermore, the regional protec-
tion is extended by the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (African Women’s 
28 Commenting on arts 16(1)(a) and (b), the CEDAW Committee (established under art 
17 of CEDAW to oversee the implementation of its provisions) in its General Recom-
mendation 21 said this: ‘While most countries report that national constitutions and 
laws comply with the Convention, custom, tradition and failure to enforce these laws 
in reality contravenes the Convention. A woman’s right to choose a spouse and enter 
freely into marriage is central to her life and to her dignity and equality as a human 
being. An examination of states parties’ reports discloses that there are countries 
which, on the basis of custom, religious beliefs or the ethnic origins of particular 
groups of people, permit forced marriages or remarriages. Other countries allow a 
woman’s marriage to be arranged for payment or preferment and in others women’s 
poverty forces them to marry foreign nationals for financial security. Subject to rea-
sonable restrictions based for example on a woman’s youth or consanguinity with 
her partner, a woman’s right to choose when, if, and whom she will marry must be 
protected and enforced at law.’
29 See art 24(3) of CRC which provides: ‘State parties shall take all effective and appro-
priate measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the 
health of children.’
30 UN General Assembly, 48th session, Official Records, GA Resolution 4, Agenda item 
11, A/RES/48/104 1994.
31 Cultural relativism promotes the belief that human rights vary from one culture to 
another.
32 Art 21 of the African Children’s Charter provides: ‘State parties to the present Charter 
shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate harmful social and cultural prac-
tices affecting the welfare, dignity, normal growth and development of the child 
and in particular: (a) those customs and practices prejudicial to the health or life 
of the child; and (b) those customs and practices discriminatory to the child on the 
grounds of sex or other status.’ The Children’s Charter was adopted on 11 July 1990 
and entered into force on 29 November 1999. Malawi ratified the Charter on 10 Sep-
tember 1999.
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Protocol).33 The Protocol was promulgated out of the African Union 
(AU)’s concern that, despite the ratification of the African Charter 
and other international human rights instruments by member states, 
women in Africa continue to be victims of discrimination and harmful 
cultural practices.34 The Protocol contains provisions relating to the 
elimination of harmful practices, including the prohibition, through 
legislative measures backed by sanctions, of all forms of harmful prac-
tices that negatively affect the human rights of women and which are 
contrary to recognised international standards.35
To sum up, we see that international human rights standards call for 
state intervention with regard to cultural practices that violate human 
rights.
3 Position of customary law in the Bill of Rights
The Constitution has many provisions that directly or indirectly recogn-
ise the application and relevance of African customary laws in Malawi. 
Section 12 provides that the Constitution is founded upon the follow-
ing underlying principles:
[A]ll legal and political authority of the state derives from the people of 
Malawi and shall be exercised in accordance with this Constitution solely 
to serve and protect their interests; the inherent dignity and worth of each 
human requires that the state and all persons shall recognise and protect 
fundamental human rights and afford the fullest protection to the rights 
and views of all individuals, groups and minorities whether or not they are 
entitled to vote.
Thus, Nyirenda, Hansen and Kaunda36 have argued, based on this pro-
vision, that the Malawian Constitution attaches great importance to 
African customary law and traditional values.
Several provisions in a bill of rights itself can support the above posi-
tion. For example, section 22(5) of the Constitution provides for the 
recognition of marriages by custom. This provision makes it obvious 
that marriages contracted according to customary laws are valid. Sec-
tion 26 of the Constitution provides that ‘[e]very person shall have the 
right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of his or 
her choice’. Although this section does not make any explicit reference 
to customary law, it expressly recognises the significance of customary 
or cultural values to human development, wellbeing and identity.37 In 
33 The Protocol was adopted on 11 July 2003 and entered into force on 25 November 
2005. Malawi ratified it on 20 May 2005.
34 See Preamble to the Protocol.
35 Art 5 of the Protocol.
36 J Nyirenda et al A comparative analysis of the human rights chapter under the Malawi 
Constitution in an international perspective (undated) xxiii.
37 See C Himonga ‘Implementing the rights of child in African legal systems: The 
Mthembu journey in search of justice’ (2001) 9 International Children’s Journal 89.
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essence, it guarantees the right of everyone to live according to the 
legal system applicable to the particular cultural group to which he or 
she (chooses to) belong.38
Section 26 of the Malawian Constitution must be contrasted with 
section 30 of the South African Constitution. The latter provides that 
‘[e]veryone has the right to use the language and to participate in the 
cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do 
so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights’. 
It has been argued that this provision means that when the right to 
culture clashes with the right to equality, the latter must take priority 
since this provision expressly subordinates the right to culture to all 
other rights in the South African Bill of Rights.39 By contrast, section 26 
of the Constitution does not have any express internal limitation. This 
may be interpreted to mean that the right to culture enjoys the same 
status as all other rights in the Malawian Bill of Rights.40
However, section 20(1) of the Constitution prohibits discrimination 
on certain specified grounds, including sex. Section 20(2) of the Con-
stitution specifically states that ‘[l]egislation may be passed addressing 
inequalities in society and prohibiting discriminatory practices and the 
propagation of such practices and may render such practices criminally 
punishable by the courts’. The right to protection against discrimina-
tion is buttressed in section 24 of the Constitution, which includes 
gender as a ground of discrimination. Furthermore, section 24(2) of the 
Constitution expressly states that ‘[a]ny law that discriminates against 
women on the basis of gender or marital status shall be invalid’. It also 
obligates the government to take legislative measures that eliminate 
customs and practices that discriminate against women, including 
practices such as sexual abuse, harassment and violence, and the 
deprivation of property, including property obtained by inheritance.
Reading sections 20(2) and 24(2) of the Constitution together one 
gets the impression that the right to culture does not enjoy the same 
status as the right to equality. Furthermore, customary law, just like 
any other law in force in Malawi, is arguably limited by section 5 of 
the Constitution.41 The principle of the supremacy of the national 
38 Himonga (n 37 above) 94.
39 See, eg, F Kaganas & C Murray ‘The contest between culture and gender equality 
under South Africa’s interim Constitution’ (1994) 21 Journal of Law and Society 427-
428; L Fishbayn ‘Litigating the right to culture: Family law in the new South Africa’ 
cited in E Grant ‘Human rights, cultural diversity and customary law in South Africa’ 
(2006) 50 Journal of African Law 2; TR Nhlapo ‘The African family and women’s rights: 
Friends or foes? (1991) Acta Juridica 135; V Broinstein ‘Reconceptualising customary 
law debate in South Africa’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 388.
40 L Mwambene ‘Reconciling African customary law with women’s rights in Malawi: 
The proposed Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Bill’ (2007) 1 Malawi Law 
Journal 113.
41 Sec 5 of the Malawian Constitution provides that ‘any act of government or any law 
that is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution shall, to the extent of such 
inconsistency, be invalid’.
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Constitution ensures that, in legal interpretation, human rights guar-
antees take precedence over any other laws or customary rules.42 The 
wording of section 5 of the Malawian Constitution seems to suggest 
that if customary law is inconsistent with the Constitution, it is invalid.43 
A further limitation on the application of customary laws is seen in sec-
tion 10(2) of the Malawian Constitution which provides that ‘… in the 
application and development of customary law, the relevant organs of 
the state shall have due regard to the principles and provisions of the 
Constitution’.
In addition, section 44(1) of the Malawian Constitution places the 
right to culture among the rights in respect of which a limitation is 
permitted. As rightly argued by Chirwa,44 the limitation clause, as pro-
vided by section 44(1), has application to all rights in a bill of rights. 
Therefore, even though section 26 does not contain an internal limit-
ing clause, the general limitation clause applied under section 44(1) of 
the Malawian Constitution would be applicable.
Having said that, it is, however, important to note that in terms of 
sections 44(1) and (2) of the Constitution, limitations on a consti-
tutional right, including the right to culture, may be permitted only 
where they are ‘prescribed by law, which are reasonable, recognised 
by international human rights standards and necessary in an open 
and democratic society’.45 Section 44(2) sets a number of tests which 
courts have to meet if it is to be constitutional, notwithstanding its 
restriction of a right or rights contained in chapter IV of the Malawian 
Constitution. The first hurdle that must be met in terms of section 
44(2) is that the rights contained may be limited by prescription of law. 
While this may be interpreted in a number of ways, a court will at least 
have to determine that the ‘prescribed law’ is certain and not vague, or 
42 B Ibhawoh ‘Between culture and constitution: Evaluating the cultural legitimacy of 
human rights in the African state’ (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly 838 847. Similar 
provisions of constitutional supremacy exist in the constitutions of other African 
countries. See eg sec 26(1) of the Constitution of Ghana; sec 37 of the Ugandan 
Constitution.
43 This position is similar to that in South Africa. Sec 2 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 provides: ‘This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; 
law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid and obligations imposed by it must be 
fulfilled.’ Commenting on sec 2 of the South African Constitution, as read with sec 
39, C Rautenbach ‘Some comments on the status of customary law in relation to the 
Bill of Rights’ (2003) 1 Stellenbosch Law Review 107 observed that ‘the wording of 
these provisions is to the effect that the application of customary law is subjected to 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution’.
44 DM Chirwa ‘Upholding the sanctity of rights: A principled approach to limitations 
and derogations under the Malawian Constitution’ (2007) 1 Malawi Law Journal 
11.
45 Sec 44(2) of the Malawian Constitution provides: ‘Without prejudice to subsection 
(1), no restrictions or limitations may be placed on the exercise of any rights and 
freedoms provided for in this Constitution other than those prescribed by law, which 
are reasonable, recognised by international human rights standards and necessary 
in an open and democratic society.’
ahrlj-2010-1-text.indd   86 6/14/10   12:32:56 PM
lacking in precision.46 Those affected by the law must be able to know 
what is expected of them. Should they be unable to do so, then the 
law would fall foul of this test.47 The question that can be asked is: If a 
limitation is effected by a constitutional right and not law, would this 
provision apply? Obviously, such are some of the difficult questions 
that courts are likely to be faced with in Malawi.
Furthermore, section 44(2) demands that a law, when it impinges 
on a right, must meet the test of being ‘reasonable’ and ‘recognised 
by international human rights standards and necessary in an open 
and democratic society’. The terms ‘reasonable’ and ‘necessary’ in an 
open and democratic society are vague and will need to be interpreted 
within the Malawian context.48 Such interpretation will obviously play 
a significant role as far as discriminatory African customary laws against 
women are concerned, where one of the questions will be whether 
enjoying one’s right to culture can be justified as a limitation on the 
right to equality.
While this will probably be answered in the affirmative, the real 
dilemma for a court will be to determine how far this limitation should 
be permitted to provide for the enjoyment of the right to culture. The 
meaning of terms such as ‘open’, ‘democratic’, ‘necessary’ and ‘rea-
sonable’ will obviously have a bearing on courts. On the other hand, 
the trend internationally in determining the meaning of these terms 
will also have a bearing on the interpretive endeavours of Malawian 
courts. Sieghardt49 states, in a European context, that to evaluate a 
democratic society one must consider
the needs or objectives of a democratic society in relation to the right or 
freedom concerned; without a notion of such needs, the limitations essen-
tial to support them cannot be evaluated. The aim is to have a pluralist, 
open, tolerant society. This necessarily involves a delicate balance between 
the wishes of the individual and the utilitarian ‘greater good of the major-
ity’. But democratic societies approach this problem from the standpoint of 
the importance of the individual, and the undesirability of restricting his or 
her freedom.
In addition to the above, section 44(3) of the Malawian Constitution 
provides that laws providing for the limitation should not negate the 
essential content of the right or freedom in question and should be of 
general application. As a result of the above discussion, the substantive 
approach becomes inevitable.
46 Chirwa (n 44 above) 18.
47 P Sieghardt The international law of human rights (1983) 92.
48 In Friday A Jumbe & Humphrey C Mvula v Attorney-General Constitutional Case 1 & 
2 of 2005 (unreported), as observed by Chirwa (n 44 above) 19, ‘[i]t was held that 
it was not enough for the state to argue in general that the reverse onus created by 
the Corrupt Practices Act was reasonable and necessary in an open and democratic 
society. The state was under the obligation to demonstrate with empirical evidence 
that such provision would lead to a reduction or curbing of corruption.’
49 Sieghardt (n 47 above) 93.
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It is, however, important to note that courts will not lightly declare 
African customary laws to be unconstitutional for being inconsis-
tent with any other right, including the right of women to equality, 
for example. This is so because any legislation that varies, alters or 
abrogates any rule of African customary law50 must not constitute an 
unjustifiable infringement on the right to culture. This also means that 
parliament does not have a free hand to overrule African customary 
law. It can do so only to the extent that it does not unjustifiably limit 
the right to culture. Essentially, this means that any legislation that 
seeks to advance and protect women’s rights must strike an appropri-
ate balance between many interests and rights, especially the right of 
women to equality and the right of individuals and groups of people 
to culture.51
In summary, we see that the interpretation of the limitation section 
will also play a large part in constitutional adjudication. The manner 
in which it restricts rights will probably be used to justify human rights 
violations.
4 Rules governing customary marriages and the Bill 
of Rights
In this section, we examine how rules and practices governing custom-
ary marriage conflict with the Bill of Rights and international human 
rights standards. However, we start by giving an overview of forms of 
customary marriages so that the rules and practices that will be dis-
cussed are put into perspective.
In Malawi, there are two forms of customary marriages, namely, 
patrilineal and matrilineal marriages.52 As a general rule, all customary 
marriages, whether matrilineal or patrilineal, are contracted according 
to the customary law of the parties.53 All customary marriage laws 
recognise as essential to the validity of the marriage compliance with 
the following: The parties must have attained the age of puberty; con-
sent of the woman’s parents to the marriage; in patrilineal societies 
lobola must be paid by a man to the woman’s parents or other relatives 
50 According to sec 48(2) of the Constitution, an ‘Act of Parliament shall have primacy 
over other forms of law but shall be subject to the Constitution’.
51 Mwambene (n 40 above) 114.
52 M Chigawa Customary law and social development: De jure marriages vis-à-vis de 
facto marriages at customary law in Malawi (1987). 
53 Generally, customary law requires that the intending spouses must be of marriage-
able age and that they should be in a good state of mind. For a detailed discussion, 
see C Himonga Family and succession laws in Zambia (1995) 75. The same issues are 
equally important in Malawi. It should be noted that Malawi is not a homogeneous 
country. It consists of different tribes whose origins go back to a historical ances-
tor or ancestress. Generally, for purposes of customary family laws, these tribes are 
divided into two categories: matrilineal and patrilineal. The matrilineal tribes are 
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who are her guardians; in matrilineal systems there must have been 
a chinkhoswe; and the woman must be unmarried. There is, however, 
no precise age when one attains puberty and may marry under the 
customary marriage laws in Malawi.54
A discussion of the formation and dissolution of these customary mar-
riages has already received considerable attention in the literature.55 It 
is, therefore, not necessary to provide details, but only a summary of 
the main ideas relating to the two forms of customary marriages, start-
ing with matrilineal marriages.
Matrilineal customary marriages can be grouped into chikamwini 
and chitengwa.56 In chikamwini marriages, the man moves to the wife’s 
village and has only a few rights there.57 Lineage is traced through the 
woman.58 Inheritance of property passes through the female line.59 
In addition, women under the matrilineal system have custodial own-
ership of land.60 It should also be noted that in matrilineal systems, 
children ‘belong’61 to the woman and remain under the guardianship 
of the wife’s eldest brother.62 A woman’s child inherits from her brother’s 
property. Upon the death of a man, the wife and children continue to 
live at the place of their abode and continue to use the land. When a 
woman dies, the husband returns to his home. Compared to patrilineal 
mostly found in 20 districts of the central and southern regions, namely, Dedza, 
Dowa, Kasungu, Lilongwe, Mchinji, Nkhotakota, Ntheu, Ntchisi, Salima, Blantyre, 
Chiradzulu, Machinga, Mangochi, Mulanje, Mwanza, Thyolo, Zomba, Balaka and 
Phalombe. The patrilineal tribes are mostly to be found in all of the six districts 
that are in the northern region and Chikwawa and Nsanje districts in the southern 
region.
54 This position has to be contrasted to civil law where they have a fixed age as to when 
one can marry. 
55 See, eg, JO Ibik Restatement of African law: Malawi Vol 1, The law of marriage and 
divorce (1970); Chigawa (n 52 above); DS Koyana et al Customary marriage systems in 
Malawi and South Africa (2007); JC Bekker Seymour’s customary law in Southern Africa 
(1989); White (n 17 above) 56. 
56 N Ngwira Women’s property and inheritance rights and the land reform process in 
Malawi (2003) 6. See also P Ntata & C Sinoya Customary law and the UN conventions 
on women and children (unpublished) (1999) 14. 
57 F von Benda-Beckmann Legal pluralism in Malawi: Historical developments 1858-1970 
and ermerging issues (2007) 89. 
58 KM Phiri ‘Some changes in the matrilineal family system among the Chewa of Malawi 
since the nineteenth century’ (1983) 24 Journal of African History 257 258.
59 Similarly, in Tanzania’s matrilineal societies, as noted by F Butegwa ‘Using the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights to secure women’s access to land in Africa’ in 
Cook (n 24 above) 497, property is inherited through the wife’s lineage.
60 This position is contrasted to Tanzania’s matrilineal societies where, as noted by 
Butegwa (n 59 above), women do not have effective control or ownership of the 
family land.
61 The word ‘belong’ is used to mean that rights and obligations toward the children in 
a matrilineal society accrue to the woman.
62 E Mandala ‘Capitalism, kinship and gender in the lower Tchiri (Shire) Valley of Malawi, 
1860-1960: An alternative theoretical framework’ (1984) 13 African Economic History 
137 139. See also Phiri (n 58 above) 258-259.
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tribes, Von Benda-Beckmann notes that the woman has a much stron-
ger position vis-à-vis her husband.63
In chitengwa marriages, the above rules also apply. There are, how-
ever, points of difference. In chitengwa (matrilineal) marriages, the 
woman goes to live in the man’s village, but the children belong to the 
woman’s lineage.64 Upon the death of the husband, the widow and 
children return to the widow’s village of origin. Therefore, although 
matrilineal to a large extent, it is similar to the patrilineal lobola system 
in other respects.65
On the other hand, in patrilineal marriage systems the matrimonial 
residence is in the man’s village. The wife leaves her village and resides 
in her husband’s village. The man pays lobola to the wife’s father or 
guardian. The payment of lobola establishes his right to take his wife 
and children to his own village, and signifies that the man owns all 
the property, and makes the children of the marriage legitimate.66 It 
should also be noted that, whilst in matrilineal tribes descent is from 
the oldest brother of the wife, in a patrilineal system descent is also 
through males but from the husband’s side.67 Daughters are expected 
to get married and live in their husbands’ villages. Therefore, they can-
not inherit property.68 Thus, some commentators have argued that 
the patrilocal nature of the marriage and the payment of lobola in 
patrilineal tribes place the man in a position to enjoy a superior status 
without any qualification.69 It should also be noted that, unlike in the 
matrilineal system where children belong to the wife and her kin, in 
the patrilineal system children of the family belong to the man and his 
kinsmen.
Having briefly looked at the two forms of customary marriages, in 
the following subsections I examine rules and practices governing 
these marriages.
4.1 Consent
Articles 16(1)(a) and (b) of CEDAW concern the goal of equality at the 
point of entering marriage. One of the key issues of this provision is 
consent: Do women have the same degree of freedom to give consent 
to a marriage as men?
Under customary family law, consent to a customary marriage by 
the parents of a woman is strictly adhered to whether the marriage is 
63 Von Benda-Beckman (n 57 above). 
64 Ngwira (n 56 above) 6; Phiri (n 58 above) 262.
65 This will be discussed later when examining how it conflicts with the Bill of Rights.
66 Ngwira (n 56 above) 6. See also A Armstrong et al ‘Towards a cultural understanding 
of the interplay between children’s and women’s rights: An Eastern and Southern 
African perspective’ (1995) The International Journal of Children’s Rights 345.
67 Ibik (n 55 above) 79. See also Armstrong et al (n 66 above) 355.
68 Ngwira (n 56 above) 7.
69 White (n 17 above) 56. 
ahrlj-2010-1-text.indd   90 6/14/10   12:32:56 PM
taking place between minors or not.70 Traditionally, the consent of 
the father in patrilineal tribes or the maternal uncle in matrilineal tribes 
was not a decision of a guardian as an individual. The whole family 
considered the matter since the issue of marriage concerned the whole 
family. In some instances it concerned the whole village.71 This posi-
tion, it could be argued, robs a woman of the opportunity for her to 
enter into marriage autonomously.
Furthermore, where women, particularly young girls, are forced by 
their families to marry men who have chosen them, autonomy is not 
exercised. In addition to the above, in some cultures, the question arises 
as to whether the widow is free to refuse to be inherited by a brother 
of her deceased husband. Polygamy also raises significant questions 
about equality and choice.72
It should, however, be noted that the requirement of consent in 
respect of customary law marriages has to be contrasted with that 
for civil marriages where the consent of parents or guardians is only 
required when one is marrying below the age of 21.73 Commenting 
on this difference, Bennett74 states:
[W]hile a civil or Christian union is exclusively the concern of the spouses 
and depends for its validity on their consent, a customary marriage is an alli-
ance of two families, for which the co-operation of the spouses is desirable, 
but not essential.
To understand this customary family rule, the definition of customary 
marriage by Bekker75 is instructive. A customary marriage is defined 
as a ‘relationship that concerns not only the husband and wife, but 
also the family groups to which they belonged before the marriage’. 
Thus, the consummation of a customary marriage brings into being 
reciprocal rights and obligations between the spouses for which their 
respective family groups are collectively responsible (my emphasis).
On the other hand, section 22(3) of the Malawian Constitution guar-
antees all men and women the right to marry and found a family. A 
similar provision is also to be found in several international instruments 
and regional human rights instruments to which Malawi is a party.76 
It is, however, noted that sections 22(6) and 22(4) of the Malawian 
70 JO Ibik ‘The law of marriage in Nyasaland’ unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
London, 1966 524, as cited by Von Benda-Beckmann (n 57 above) 86. See also the 
discussion by Armstrong (n 66 above) 362.
71 Ibik (n 70 above). 
72 See discussion below.
73 See sec 11(b) of the Marriage Act, chr 25:01. See also sec 24 of the South African 
Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
74 TW Bennett Human rights and African customary law under the South African Constitu-
tion (1995) 113. 
75 Bekker (n 55 above) 96. 
76 See, eg, art 16(1) of the Universal Declaration. It provides that ‘men and women … 
have a right to marry and found a family’; arts 17 & 23 of ICCPR; art 10 of ICESCR; 
art 16 of CEDAW; arts 18, 27 & 29 of the African Charter. 
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Constitution set restrictions for entry into marriage. It is, therefore, 
submitted that these sections provide limitations to section 22(3) of 
the Malawian Constitution.
Section 22(6) of the Malawian Constitution provides that ‘no person 
over the age of eighteen years shall be prevented from entering into 
marriage’. This means that every person over 18 years is at liberty to 
marry. The opposite is also true of those who are below 18 years. They 
lack legal capacity to enter into marriage. On the other hand, section 
22(4) is to the effect that for those who are 18 years and above, marriage 
shall take place only with their free and full consent.77 It is, therefore, 
submitted that the legal requirement of consent by a guardian78 to a 
customary marriage conflicts with a number of women’s rights in the 
following ways:
First, if the guardian withholds his consent to a woman who is older 
than 18 years, this would be in conflict with section 22(3) of the Mala-
wian Constitution which, as noted in the preceding paragraph, grants 
every person the right to marry. This customary law requirement, 
therefore, diminishes a woman’s status since it effectively relegates her 
to a position of a legal minor rather than a mature adult. Furthermore, 
in view of section 22(4) of the Malawian Constitution, a marriage which 
requires the consent of the village or a marriage guardian conflicts with 
the right to enter into marriage with a woman’s free and full consent.
Secondly, if the guardian gives his consent to a girl who is younger 
than 18 years, this would be in conflict with section 22(6) that sets the 
marrying age at 18. Thirdly, this would also be an infringement of her 
personal freedom.79
From the above, we see that the customary law rule that no marriage 
can be contracted without the consent of the guardian is at variance 
with the Bill of Rights and international human rights instruments 
aimed at protecting women’s rights to equality and choice.
Interlinked with consent there is the question of choice of a spouse. 
In both the matrilineal and patrilineal customary marriage systems, 
the decision on whom to marry is made primarily by the man con-
cerned or such a man in consultation with his kin. A woman, under 
customary law, is not expected to make a move and propose marriage. 
A woman who actively makes such a proposal is considered to have 
loose morals.80 So her choice of whom to marry is squarely dependent 
on who gets interested in her and makes a proposal. With such a belief 
77 Sec 22(4) of the Malawian Constitution is similar to art 16(1)(b) of CEDAW that states 
that ‘women should also enjoy the right to freely choose and enter into marriage 
only with their free and full consent’.
78 It should be noted that ‘guardian’ is used interchangeably with the parents of the 
woman intending to marry under customary laws. 
79 See sec 19 of the Malawian Constitution. 
80 Ntata & Sinoya (n 56 above) 15. 
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system, arguably, the choice of a spouse is severely compromised for 
a woman.
Useful expressions, found in the vernacular languages of Malawi, 
can help shed light on the issue of choice.81 In the vernacular it is only 
a man who can ‘marry’ a woman: kukwatira82 or kutola.83 A woman 
‘gets to be married’: kukwatiwa84 or kutoleka.85 Thus, clues to the dif-
ficulties that women face in realising their right to choose whom to 
marry can be found in the above vernacular usage.86 This position can 
be contrasted with the English position, for example, where both men 
and women ‘get married’ to each other.
The cultural practice that only men are expected to make a spousal 
choice, and not women, is a human rights issue on the basis that it 
is against women’s rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Malawian 
Constitution, as well as against international standards. It does not 
rhyme well with section 22(3) of the Malawian Constitution, which 
provides that ‘all men and women have the right to marry and found a 
family’. It should be noted that this provision does not mention the issue 
of choice. However, it can be argued that it grants all men and women 
the right to marry someone of their choice. Moreover, a woman’s right 
to choose whom to marry is guaranteed by international instruments to 
which Malawi is a party. Article 16(1)(b) of CEDAW states that ‘women 
should also enjoy the right to freely choose a spouse and enter into 
marriage only with their free and full consent’.87
Therefore, it is submitted that the customary law tradition which 
only gives the right to propose marriage to men, and not to women, is 
incompatible with the Bill of Rights and international standards for the 
protection of women’s rights.
4.2 Polygamy
The debate whether polygamy constitutes a violation of women’s rights 
or is in fact a ‘good’ system that protects them has been ongoing for 
a long time.88 Those who are against polygamy point to the fact that 
the custom is degrading to women and violates their rights to equality 
with men. This view finds support within the human rights paradigm 
which does not condone polygamy.89 Those who support the con-
81 As above. 
82 This word is used in matrilineal systems.
83 This word is used in patrilineal systems. 
84 This word is used in matrilineal systems. 
85 This word is used in patrilineal systems and literally means ‘taken by’. 
86 Ntata & Sinoya (n 56 above) 14. 
87 See also art 1 of the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage 
and Registration of Marriages, 1962, GA Res 1763A (XVIII) of 7 November 1962. 
88 F Banda Women, law and human rights: An African perspective (2005) 116.
89 See, eg, CEDAW General Recommendation 21 para 21; art 6(c) of the African Wom-
en’s Protocol.
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tinuation of the practice of polygamy argue that rather than violate 
women’s rights, polygamy may facilitate their enjoyment.90 Banda91 
further notes that the intensity of the debate over polygamy has not 
lessened over time, pointing to the debates held during the drafting of 
the African Women’s Protocol in which article 6(c) of the Protocol was 
a compromise.
As noted earlier, both matrilineal and patrilineal customary marriages 
in Malawi are potentially polygamous.92 The husband is allowed to 
marry more than one wife.93 On the other hand, a married woman is 
barred from contracting further marriages for as long as she remains 
legally married.94 Concurring with Kamchedzera,95 customary laws 
favour the husband with regard to sexuality.
In Malawi, the prevalence of this practice is demonstrated by a study 
conducted by the Malawi Human Rights Commission (MHRC),96 
which shows that polygamy is still a common practice in all areas.97 
The study shows that about 98 per cent of the respondents interviewed 
stated that polygamy is still practised in their areas. It has also been 
established that 17 per cent of all women in Malawi are in polygamous 
unions.98 In other African countries, a 1995 survey of eight anglo-
phone countries established the prevalence rates of married women 
in polygamous marriages as follows: in Ghana, approximately 28 per 
cent; in Kenya, 19,5 per cent; in Nigeria, 42,6 per cent; and in Zimba-
bwe, one in five married Zimbabwean women and the average union 
was found to consist of 2,3 wives per man.99 In South Africa, a study 
by Govender100 shows that only 6 per cent of the women interviewed 
were married to men who had more than one wife. Interesting to note 
90 T Nhlapo ‘African family law under an undecided constitution: The challenge for law 
reform in South Africa’ in J Eekelaar & T Nhlapo (eds) The changing family: Family 
forms and family law (1998) 629, as cited by Banda (n 88 above) 116.
91 Nhlapo (n 90 above).
92 See Mphumeya v Republic, as cited by GS Kamchedzera ‘Malawi: Improving family 
welfare’ (1993-1994) 32 Journal of Family Law 372. As noted by Bekker (n 54 above) 
126, this is also similar to the patrilineal customary marriage in South Africa.
93 Ibik (n 55 above) 191. 
94 See Msowoya v Milanzi Civil Appeal Case 99 of 1979, NTAC (unreported). 
95 Kamchedzera (n 92 above) 374.
96 MHRC Cultural practices and their impact on the enjoyment of human rights, particu-
larly women and children (2005) 18.
97 The study covered 10 of the 27 administrative districts in Malawi. 
98 WLSA Malawi & SARDC WIDSAA Beyond inequalities 2005: Women in Malawi (2005) 
19-20. 
99 The Centre for Reproductive Law and Policy and FIDA-(K) Women of the world: 
Laws and policies affecting their reproductive lives — Anglophone Africa as cited by 
EM Kisaakye ’Women, culture and human rights: Female genital mutilation, polyg-
amy and bride price’ in B Wolfgang et al (eds) Human rights of women: International 
instruments and African experiences (2002) 277.
100 P Govender The status of women married in terms of African customary law: A study of 
women’s experiences in the Eastern Cape and Western Cape Provinces (2000) 32.
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is that the MHRC study also found strong support for the continuation 
of the practice from women respondents.101 Similarly, Kisaakye102 has 
also noted that some women have voiced support for the practice.
The above position, it could be argued, has a bearing on what impact 
the Bill of Rights and international human rights norms can have on 
human rights violations that come with polygamy. With women sup-
porting the practice, it is doubtful that a formal approach of abolishing 
the institution of polygamy as proposed by the Malawi Law Commis-
sion103 would be a solution in addressing human rights violations.
On the other hand, sections 20(1) and (2) of the Malawian Constitu-
tion provide as follows:
Discrimination of persons in any form is prohibited and all persons are, 
under any law, guaranteed equal and effective protection against discrimi-
nation on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, nationality, ethnic or social origin, disability, property, birth or 
other status. Legislation may be passed addressing inequality in society and 
prohibiting discriminatory practices and the propaganda of such practices 
and may render such practices criminally punishable by the courts (my 
emphasis).
The prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sex is, arguably, 
intended to protect women.104 By including sex as a ground on which 
discrimination is not allowed, section 20 of the Malawian Constitution 
leaves no doubt that no discrimination based on sex will be toler-
ated. Moreover, at international law, several international conventions 
to which Malawi is a party proscribe discrimination on the basis of 
sex.105
In a polygamous marriage, especially in a patrilineal system, at the 
point of contracting a subsequent marriage a man unilaterally may 
introduce new wives to the family and has many opportunities to 
marry, while each wife may have only one shared husband.106
101 This finding has to be contrasted with the Malawi Law Commission’s Report on the 
Review of Marriage and Divorce Laws in Malawi (2005) 29 which found, during the 
regional consultations, that 95% of the respondents cited more disadvantages than 
advantages of polygamy and had voiced strong support for it to be abolished. The 
study by the Malawi Law Commission could be compared to the study by Govender 
(n 100 as above) in South Africa, which shows that the predominant view (75%), 
reflected by most interviews, was for the abolition of polygamy.
102 Wolfgang et al (n 99 above) 279.
103 Malawi Law Commission (n 101 above).
104 This position is also similar to sec 9(3) of the South African Constitution, 1996. It 
should, however, be noted that other constitutional provisions, eg, sec 13(5) of the 
Constitution of Tanzania, as noted by Banda (n 88 above) 35, do not include sex as 
one of the grounds on which discrimination is prohibited in their non-discrimination 
clause.
105 Eg, arts 2 & 7 of the Universal Declaration; arts 2, 2(1), 3 & 20 of ICCPR; arts 2, 2(2) 
and 3 of ICESCR; art 1 of CEDAW; and arts 2, 19 & 28 of the African Charter.
106 See also CRM Dlamini The ultimate recognition of the customary marriage in South 
Africa (1999) 32.
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With the coming of HIV/AIDS, polygamy puts women’s rights to 
health in jeopardy.107 Under article 12 of ICESCR, state parties recog-
nise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health. Given the attendant problems 
associated with polygamy, including compromised rights to sex and 
to a relationship generally, women are denied their rights. In light of 
the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Malawi, polygamy also affects women’s 
rights to life. The conduct of a husband having multiple partners 
increases women’s vulnerability to be infected with HIV. This position is 
supported by Malawi Law Commission’s findings:108
Polygamy helps in the spread of HIV and AIDS as wives who may feel lonely 
and neglected may turn to other men for the satisfaction of their sexual 
needs. The implications of HIV and AIDS infection in a polygamous family 
were considered quite serious as large numbers of a family may be wiped 
out by the pandemic.
The practice of polygamy directly conflicts with section 20 of the Mala-
wian Constitution and international instruments on the protection 
of women’s rights to equality as it treats women differently to men. 
Arguably, in both matrilineal and patrilineal marriage systems, there is 
a prima facie case of unfair discrimination because women are treated 
differently to men. However, one can hardly suggest that the inequality 
would be addressed if women were given the same opportunity to 
accumulate men as spouses.109 Concurring with Goody, the notion of 
one woman acting as a wife to more than one man would indeed sug-
gest greater oppression, not liberation.110 On the other hand, the fact 
that women support the practice speaks volumes of why a substantive 
approach should be preferred.
4.3 Lobola
In patrilineal systems, the payment of lobola by the bridegroom (repre-
sented by bridegroom/guardian family members) to the bride’s family 
as represented by the bride’s guardian is a prerequisite for a valid mar-
riage under African customary law.111 Mofokeng112 defines lobola as
107 Wolfgang et al (n 99 above) 279.
108 Malawi Law Commission (n 101 above) 29: See also Wolfgang et al (n 99 above) 
279.
109 F Kaganas & C Murray ‘Law, women and the family: The question of polygyny in a 
new South Africa’ (1991) Acta Juridica 126.
110 J Goody The Oriental, the ancient and the primitive: Systems of marriage and the family 
in the pre-industrial societies of Eurasia (1990) 140, as cited by Kaganas & Murray (n 
109 above) 127. 
111 Chigawa (n 52 above) 5. 
112 LL Mofokeng ‘The lobola agreement as the silent prerequisite for the validity of a 
customary marriage in terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriage Act’ (2005) 
68 Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 278.
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[a]n agreement between the family group of the prospective husband and 
the family group of the prospective wife that on or before the marriage 
ceremony, there would be the transfer of property from the family group of 
the husband, to the family group of the wife in respect of the marriage.
In Malawi, of the people interviewed by MHRC, about 62 per cent were 
in support of the institution. Similarly, in South Africa, a study by Gov-
ender113 shows that 85 per cent of the women interviewed indicated 
whole-hearted support for the system of lobola. These findings point 
to the fact that women and society at large are supportive of lobola. In 
view of this fact, it is clear that a formal approach is not likely to suc-
ceed because communities do not see it as a violation of their human 
rights. What may be practical, as a suggestion, is to address the sting of 
violations of human rights pertaining to lobola itself.
It is important to note that under patrilineal marriage, the failure to 
institute lobola negotiations renders the marriage void. As Dlamini114 
has rightly observed, Africans in general
are unable to regard a relationship as a marriage even if there can be com-
pliance with all legal requirements if lobola has not been delivered or an 
agreement for its delivery [has not been] concluded.
In view of the above, to an African woman, negotiating and the subse-
quent delivery of lobola means a valid marriage. The opposite is also 
true. A formal approach to addressing human rights violations that 
come with lobola would require legislating against the practice. Such 
an approach would likely face resistance because it strikes at the very 
significant requirement of an African marriage.
Furthermore, for African patrilineal societies, lobola has a deeper 
cultural symbolism than the commercial meaning ascribed to it by its 
detractors.115 It underscores the fact that a customary marriage cre-
ates an alliance not only between husband and wife, but also between 
their respective families and kinships.116 It is the bedrock on which the 
African family in patrilineal societies is based. From lobola arise recip-
rocal rights and duties amongst the family groups concerned.117 For 
instance, the male guardian who receives lobola does not only act as a 
mediator in cases involving disputes between the parties to a marriage, 
but he is also expected to assist in stabilising the marriage by protecting 
the wife if she is mistreated, deserted or neglected. In highlighting its 
significance in the African family, Koyana, Mwambene and Bekker have 
rightly observed that lobola is the ‘great invention of customary law’ 
113 Govender (n 100 above) 29.
114 CRM Dlamini ‘The modern legal significance of ilobolo in Zulu society’ (1984) De Jure 
149, as cited in Mofokeng (n 112 above) 279. 
115 See the criticisms by White (n 17 above) 53. 
116 See Bekker (n 55 above) 151 and Banda (n 88 above) 108. 
117 Mofokeng (n 112 above) 282.
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that adequately balances the interests of the parties in a marriage.118 
If it is established that a woman was persistently treated cruelly and 
she refuses to go back to her husband, customary law favours her. The 
lobola is forfeited.119
From the above discussion, we see that the institution of lobola is 
at the centre of negotiating and balancing all rights that come with a 
customary marriage in the patrilineal system. So, looking at the protec-
tive aspects that come with lobola, it is obvious that no woman would 
want to forfeit that in a marriage, and it may explain its support.
At the same time, lobola has often been criticised for being an institu-
tion of oppression.120 Critics link women’s subordination and lack of a 
strong voice within marriage with the payment of lobola, which makes 
both the women and their families of origin dependent on their abu-
sive partners.121 Some critics go so far as to say that lobola constructs 
women as property.122 Ironically, it has been noted that this was also 
the view of colonial authorities who likened it to purchase.123 People 
holding this view argue that to continue with the practice is to perpetu-
ate and encourage the subjugation of women.124
For purposes of our discussion, however, it is important to note that 
the payment or non-payment of lobola has great legal significance for 
the rights of women. It determines the rights that a man has over his 
wife and children.125 Custody over children depends on the fulfilment 
of the obligations under the lobola agreement.126 A father and his fam-
ily are entitled to the custody of any children born out of the marriage 
as long as lobola was paid or where the wife’s people are satisfied with 
the instalments not to question the validity of the marriage. It is, how-
ever, to be noted that there is no similar customary law that applies to 
the woman. In this instance, the customary law works to the advan-
tage of men. It has also been observed that, traditionally, children were 
regarded as the most important, and sometimes the only, reason for 
getting married.127 The payment of lobola thus denies women all rights 
to their children, as well as control over their lives.
118 Koyana et al (n 55 above) 32.
119 As above.
120 White (n 17 above) 53.
121 Banda (n 88 above) 110.
122 Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC) Beyond Inequalities: 
Women in Zambia (2005), as cited by Banda (n 88 above) 110.
123 Wolfgang et al (n 99 above) 281.
124 As above.
125 See also Aiya v Aiya Divorce Cause 8 of 1973 (unreported) Ugandan case, as cited by 
Wolfgang et al (n 99 above) 281. 
126 See also Bekker (n 55 above) 234 and Armstrong et al (n 66 above) 348.
127 A Shenje-Peyton ‘Balancing gender, equality, and cultural identity: Marriage pay-
ments in post-colonial Zimbabwe’ (1997) 9 Harvard Human Rights Journal 106. 
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In addition to the above, the privileged position of a husband that 
comes with the lobola institution is also evident in the married persons’ 
property relationships.128 Under patrilineal customary family laws, any 
property the wife brought into the marriage, and which was part of 
the common household, is accredited to the husband. A wife does not 
have property rights. In the lifetime of a husband, he has control. A 
wife cannot dispose of household goods without the consent of her 
husband.129
A striking similarity to the lack of property rights of married women 
in patrilineal marriages is what Fredman130 draws our attention to. She 
notes that in the post-feudal legal system:
Coverture gave the husband near-absolute control over the wife’s property 
as well as her person. Married women were perpetual minors, divested of 
the possibility of economic independence. Any property which a married 
woman had owned as a single woman became her husband’s property on 
marriage: personal property vesting absolutely, real property during the 
lifetime of a husband. Similarly, he had absolute rights to all property which 
came into her hands during her marriage, including all her earned income.
It is, therefore, not surprising that section 24131 of the Malawian Con-
stitution guarantees an equal right to full and equal protection by law. 
Furthermore, section 22(1)132 of the Constitution guarantees equality 
within the family. It should be noted that section 24 of the Constitution 
is a unique one and finds its parallels in articles 16(1)(c), (d) and (f) of 
CEDAW.
Arguably, this constitutional provision can be used to address the 
inequality that comes with lobola. Therefore, the legal significance of 
the cultural determination of the custody of children and of property 
rights depending on the institution of lobola clearly goes against wom-
en’s rights and freedom. It violates not only international standards133 
to which Malawi is a party, but also the Malawian Constitution in sec-
tions 19, 20, 24 and 28.134
128 Von Benda-Beckmann (n 57 above) 89.
129 As above. See also White (n 17 above) 58.
130 S Fredman Women and law (1997) 40, based on accounts by W Blackstone Commen-
taries on the law of England (1809); JH Baker An introduction to English legal history 
(1979), among others.
131 Secs 24 (1)(a)(ii) & (iii) of the Malawian Constitution provide: ‘(1) Women have the 
right to full and equal protection by the law, and have the right not to be discrimi-
nated against on the basis of their marital status which includes the right … (a) to 
be accorded the same rights as men in civil law, including equal capacity; … (ii) to 
acquire and maintain rights in property, independently or in association with others, 
regardless of their marital status; (iii) to acquire and retain custody, guardianship 
and care of children and to have an equal right in the making of decisions that affect 
their upbringing’ (my emphasis).
132 Sec 22(1) provides that ‘[e]ach member of the family shall enjoy full and equal respect 
and shall be protected by law against all forms of neglect, cruelty or exploitation’.
133 See arts 16(1)(c), (d) & (f) of CEDAW. 
134 Sec 28 provides for the right to property. See also White (n 17 above) 59.
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4.4 Child marriage
Child marriage is particularly problematic. Writing on child marriage in 
Africa, Poulter states:135
Marriages of girls under the age of 16 are not uncommon in Africa. It is very 
unusual for African customary laws to specify a minimum age for marriage. 
Rather it is left to parents to decide when a girl is ready for marriage and the 
onset of puberty is often regarded as the key prerequisite.
As noted, in respect of both matrilineal and patrilineal marriages, there 
is no precise age as to when one attains adulthood and may be able 
to marry under the customary marriage laws of Malawi. The age of 
marriage is determined by the attainment of puberty.136 The gradu-
ation to adulthood is, in most cases, attained when one has reached 
puberty and, in some cases, after completing an initiation ceremony.137 
Puberty and the completion of ceremonies are not directly connected 
to age.138
In addition to the above, some cultural practices encourage child mar-
riages in Malawi. Some of these cultural practices are now discussed.
4.4.1 Chimeta masisi
Chimeta masisi is the replacement of a deceased wife.139 It is a practice 
by which a bereaved husband marries a younger sister or niece of his 
deceased wife.140 In most parts where this practice is common, the 
MHRC found that it is usually encouraged by parents who let their 
young daughters marry a brother-in-law. In most cases, however, these 
young daughters try to run away, but always end up being taken back. 
This, obviously, points to the fact that they are forced into these mar-
riages; otherwise there would not be attempts to run away.
Some parents, in areas where lobola is paid, do this because they are 
afraid that the husband will ask for his lobola back.141 Others, it was 
established, do it because they think that the death of the daughter 
will prevent them from accessing the wealth of the son-in-law.142 Yet 
other parents are said to do it because they would want to keep the 
135 S Poulter ‘African customs in an English setting: Legal and policy aspects of recogni-
tion’ (1988) 31 Journal of African Law 210.
136 See also a discussion by TW Bennett Customary law in South Africa (2004) 304 for a 
similar position with respect to the patrilineal marriages of South Africa. 
137 Puberty for girls is reached when menstruation starts.
138 Chigawa (n 52 above) 5 and Armstrong et al (n 66 above) 337-340. 
139 MHRC (n 96 above) 22. 
140 According to the MHRC study, 40% of the respondents reported that replacement of 
a deceased wife takes place in their areas. It was, however, found to be particularly 
common in patrilineal systems. 
141 Under patrilineal customary laws, however, there is no rule that upon the death of a 
wife lobola should be paid back.
142 MHRC (n 96 above) 22. 
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son-in-law in their family since he is of good character. And some think 
that they would be protecting their grandchildren. More disturbing is 
the fact that these daughters could be as young as 15 and marry a man 
who might be 50 or older.143 Clearly, this is a form of child marriage.
4.4.2 Mbirigha
Mbirigha means ‘bonus wife’. In this practice, the husband is given 
a younger sister or niece of his wife to take as his second wife. The 
girl is sometimes enticed by the sister to join her in her marriage, or 
encouraged by aunts and parents to enter the union.144 Sometimes the 
husband initiates the process himself.
The purposes of mbirigha include the following: First, it is a sign of 
gratitude to the son-in-law who is regarded as very generous or as 
one who takes proper care of their daughter and the parents them-
selves. Secondly, mbirigha is offered to bear children for the husband 
if the elder sister is barren, or has stopped bearing children because 
of advanced age. Thirdly, if the husband is rich, the wife may want to 
protect the wealth by letting her younger sister join her so that the man 
does not marry elsewhere. At times, the older sister would invite her 
younger sister in order to have someone with whom to live in the event 
that the husband dies. So too, the older sister may want to consolidate 
her power at her new home.
This practice, although said to be in general decline, was found to 
have been common in many of the areas covered by the study con-
ducted by the MHRC. The mbirigha, as in the case of chimeta masisi 
discussed above, can be as young as 15, if not younger, depending on 
the age at which she attained puberty. Here again, we see that similar 
violations occur to the mbirigha.
4.4.3 Kupawila
Kupawila means paying off a debt by marrying a daughter.145 The 
most common form of kupawila in the northern parts of the Chitipa 
district occurs when the daughter’s parents get into debt and as pay-
ment for the debt offer their daughter in marriage to the creditor. The 
daughter could be as young as nine and the man could be 40 or older. 
The daughter in this situation ends up attaining puberty while stay-
ing with the husband. Such daughters, it was established, stick with 
this arrangement because they are threatened that some curse would 
befall them if they tried to run away.146 The MHRC found that 15,4 per 
143 As above. 
144 The MHRC found that 45% of interviewees said that ‘bonus wife’ is a practice that 
takes place in their area.
145 MHRC (n 96 above) 23-24. 
146 As above. 
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cent of the respondents in their survey said that kupawila still persisted 
in their communities.
A variation of kupawila in the Mzimba district takes place when par-
ents eye a male tenant on an estate who is hard-working and shows 
good prospects for doing well financially. The parents could then ask 
the tenant to do some piecework for them at their house. When the 
work has been done, some parents claim that they cannot pay for the 
services rendered but can instead give the tenant their daughter. In 
such cases the tenant is not asked to pay lobola.
Another form of kupawila the study came across is when parents send 
daughters as young as nine to stay with a rich man. The parents and 
the rich man would already have agreed, and money or cattle would 
already have changed hands. The daughter would be oblivious of the 
arrangement that her stay with the rich man is going to materialise into 
a marriage.
In both the Chitipa and the Mzimba districts, a variation of the prac-
tice of kupawila involves an arrangement by which the parents of a boy 
and those of a girl become very close and, in an attempt to strengthen 
their relationship, arrange that their children should marry each other. 
In the end they force their children into marriage.147
Having said that, it is observed that at the international level there 
have been several attempts to tackle the problem of child marriages, 
including the 1956 Slavery Convention,148 the UN Convention on 
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age of Marriage and Registration of 
Marriages 1962 and CEDAW.149 On the African continent, the African 
Children’s Charter prohibits early marriage and specifies 18 as the legal 
age of marriage.150 The African Women’s Protocol has also specified a 
minimum age of marriage of 18 years.151
As noted earlier in this article, sections 22(6), (7) and (8) of the 
Malawian Constitution regulate the age for entering into marriage. 
Subsection (6) provides that: ‘[n]o person over the age of eighteen 
years shall be prevented from entering into marriage’. This provision, 
as noted earlier, sets the marrying age at 18 years.152 It is clear that 
this constitutional provision is intended to protect young girls against 
child marriages. However, subsection (7) requires that those who are 
aged between 15 and 18 need parental consent. By allowing persons 
147 MHRC (n 96 above) 24. 
148 Art 2 of the UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave 
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery 1956.
149 Art 16(2) of CEDAW. See also CEDAW General Recommendation 21 paras 36, 38 & 
39.
150 Art 21(2) African Children’s Charter.
151 Art 6(b) African Women’s Protocol.
152 See also DM Chirwa ‘A full loaf is better than half: The constitutional protection 
of economic, social and cultural rights in Malawi’ (2005) 49 Journal of African Law 
215. 
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of between 15 and 18 to enter into marriage with the consent of their 
parents, the Malawian Constitution fails to categorically prohibit child 
marriages.153 Subsection (8) discourages marriages between persons 
where either of them is under the age of 15 years.154 This provision sug-
gests that marriage with a person younger than 15 years of age may be 
permitted since the state is obliged only to discourage such a marriage 
and not prohibit it. The cumulative effect of section 22(8), as read with 
section 23 of the Malawian Constitution that provides for the rights of 
children against exploitation, however, is that children under 18 years 
of age should rather not marry. Such an interpretation would be in 
accordance with the age of majority as required by the international 
standards to which Malawi is a party.
The MHRC findings on the cultural practices that encourage child 
marriages clearly show that some parents are indirectly or directly 
behind these marriages. For that reason, it is doubtful that a categorical 
prohibition of child marriages, which would be the formal approach, 
would yield the desired result of addressing human rights violations that 
come with child marriages. It is therefore suggested that a substantive 
approach, which would include addressing the socio-economic circum-
stances behind the support, in some instances becomes inevitable.
5 Conclusion
This paper has highlighted some of the major rules and practices per-
taining to contracting a customary marriage under African customary 
laws that potentially offend against the Bill of Rights and international 
human rights standards aimed at protecting women’s rights. What 
has been evident from the analysis undertaken is that some features 
of African customary law governing a marriage effectively discriminate 
against women on the basis of their sex and, accordingly, are in direct 
conflict with the Bill of Rights and international human rights law. 
Moreover, this discrimination not only deprives women of the capacity 
to exercise their constitutional rights, but weakens their overall status 
in society by not treating them with the human dignity afforded to 
men.
Malawi has an obligation under the Constitution and those inter-
national instruments that it has ratified to do all within its powers to 
stop discriminatory cultural practices against women. The question 
therefore should be how this should be done. By recognising the 
153 Similar sentiments were also expressed in Malawi Law Commission Constitutional 
Review Programme: Consultative Paper (undated) 21. See also Ntata & Sinoya (n 56 
above) 13. 
154 Sec 22(8) of the Malawian Constitution provides that ‘[t]he state shall actually dis-
courage marriage between persons where either of them is under the age of fifteen 
years’. 
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power of cultural influence on the acts of both men and women, I 
intended to show that any efforts to eradicate these practices, however 
well-meaning, must be undertaken with a very high level of cultural 
sensitivity and hence I am advocating a substantive approach. The 
straightforward formal approach of addressing human rights violations 
is not satisfactory. Moreover, the conflict between human rights and 
African customary law needs to be analysed from many angles, includ-
ing the reasons for the support by both men and women for some of 
the cultural beliefs which may seem to violate their human rights.
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